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The Emergence of United States Human Rights Policy during Argentina’s Dirty War 
Argentina’s Dirty War from 1976-1983 was an ideological and criminal dictatorship 
regime that took the lives of approximately 30,000 Argentine people. In America, the 20th 
century’s second quarter experienced an ideological paralysis with the cold war and détente 
negotiations. Consequentially, the United States initially supported Argentina’s military regime 
due to the perception of a strong and independent government resilient to Soviet influences. 
United States Ambassador to Argentina Robert C. Hill looked to the Argentine generals as a 
source of stability and implementation of a “moderate government now led by Gen[eral] Videla” 
to uphold “interests, like ours” and oppose communist forces.1 Once the atrocities and death tolls 
began to rise during Carter’s presidency, however, the United States started to prioritize global 
human rights protection over ideological political differences. In other words, Carter’s passion 
for human rights placed the protection of human rights as the keystone of foreign policy. 
Human rights networks in the United States and Argentina raised integral awareness of 
human rights violations and informed key United States policy under Carter’s administration 
during the Dirty War.  The Dirty War’s emergence after détente’s formation forced a shifting 
definition of non-interference in global affairs to include the protection of human rights, even if 
intervention and investigation was required. One of the most important policies underlying 
United States intervention in the Dirty War is the Truman Doctrine, which committed the United 
                                                          
1 Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 9. 
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States to provide aid (economic and military) to assist countries threatened by communism’s 
infiltration. What happened when such aid supported and funded human rights abuses? In the 
new era of human rights, United States precedents were challenged: humanitarian protection 
took priority over upholding doctrines. With the help of nongovernmental organizations and 
activism campaigns, Carter’s administration integrated human rights into congressional policy 
and took steps to prioritize human rights over politics to globally help people abused by systems 
of oppression and gross human rights violations. 
Considering both Argentina’s and the United States’ shared passion against communism, 
Argentina’s interest in military dictatorship seemingly aligned with John F. Kennedy’s interest in 
“promoting internal security” in Latin America.2 Although not readily apparent to Kennedy (and 
subsequently Nixon), the dictatorship created the opposite effect: extensive human rights abuses. 
In March 1976, the military took power in Argentina by overthrowing the government in a 
coup.3 Before Jorge Rafael Videla spearheaded the military takeover, The Peronist movement – 
named after Juan Peron - dominated Argentina’s last thirty years of government.4 The Peronism 
movement was generally associated with liberal and socialist ideas, such as affordable housing 
and unionized work environments. During the Peronist era, many elections were fraudulent and 
the power of Congress and the courts were so diluted they became essentially figureheads for a 
weak government susceptible to the infiltration of power groups (the military, business, and 
Catholic Church).5 Years of “political instability, economic stagnation, and social upheaval” in 
                                                          
2 William Michael Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and US Cold War Policy 
toward Argentina (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 29. 
3  Paul H. Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals: The 'Dirty War' in Argentina (Westport: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 2002), 4.  
4 United States Embassy Argentina, “PARM--annual policy and resources assessment for Argentina--part 
I,” Cable, (7 April 1977), Digital National Security Archive, http://www.state.gov/m/a/ips/c22790.htm. 
(accessed 7 March 2017), 4.  
5 Rabe, The Killing Zone, 3. 
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Argentina increased the public’s disdain for 1975 President Isabel Peron and fueled general 
support for the military regime.6 To many Argentines, the new structure offered hope for a 
different and potentially more stable future with livable wages and abundant economic 
opportunities.7 The Radical Civic Union to the Communist Party supported the military regime 
and justified the coup by accusing the Peronist party lacking “ethical and moral standing” and 
therefore unable to lead a nation.8 Tragically, the military regime created clandestine torture 
facilities and killed approximately 30,000 Argentine citizens from 1976 to 1983. The “Dirty 
War” was not a war at all, but rather one-sided oppression of any Argentine people suspected to 
have affiliation with left-wing politics. 
Historical precedent and Cold War scars dominated the United States political climate in 
the 1970s and informed the United States’ response to Argentina’s atrocities. Since Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s implementation of the Good Neighbor Policy in 1933, United States foreign 
relations aimed to support and form relationships with Latin American countries. After 
Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman accepted the Charter of the Organization of American States which 
stopped any state from intervening “directly or indirectly, for any reason, whatever, in the 
external or internal affairs of another state.”9 Both agreements fostered a sense of western 
hemispheric unity while carefully drawing a line between appropriate (aid) and inappropriate 
(unwarranted intrusion) intervention. There are several other layers to consider when 
approaching the United States’ role in Argentina’s Dirty War. The 1970s in America were 
                                                          
6 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere, 11.  
7 Danielle N. Olean, “Because I Said So: Constructing Identities in Argentina’s Dirty War,” University of 
New Hampshire (Spring 2013). 
http://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1100&context=honors (accessed April 2, 2017), 6. 
8 Ibid, 8.  
9 Rabe, The Killing Zone, 15.  
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characterized by the aftermath of Vietnam’s failure and détente’s formation and deterioration, 
likely increasing the United States’ motivation to pursue isolationist policy.  
Since historical policies often contained conflicting perspectives of Latin American, 
intervention, clear political ideology and grassroots support influenced the United States’ 
decision to sever its relationship with Argentina on humanitarian grounds. Human rights 
organizations likely paid no attention to documents governing foreign relations, as their main 
goal was simply stopping human rights abuse. United States policy, however, was of course 
more political than human rights organizations. According to the Good Neighbor Policy, the 
United States was obligated to support Argentina and the military regime of an independent 
nation. The Charter of the Organization of American States, however, strictly viewed 
involvement of internal affairs as unjust and excessive. If the United States wanted to maintain a 
good relationship with Argentina, they had to meticulously weigh the costs and benefits of 
intervention. Since human rights organizations – at the grassroots and international level – 
prioritized eradicating human rights abuses over maintaining balanced transnational political 
alliances, their involvement proved integral to ignite United States human rights policy.10 
Initially, the United States perceived the military coup as a sign of Argentine 
independence and strength. Nixon and Kissinger ultimately viewed the military takeover as 
evidence of Argentina’s move towards a strong government, and “’Kissinger gave the 
Argentines the green light’” in a private telegram.11 Essentially, the green light allowed the 
military coup in Argentina to take any measures possible to restore order in Argentina. As a 
result, Kissinger’s green light message in combination with his general view that “human rights 
                                                          
10 Kenneth Cmiel, "The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States," The Journal of 
American History 86, no. 3 (December 1, 1999):1231-1250, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2568613 
(accessed March 16, 2017), 1232.  
11 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere, 53.  
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are not appropriate in a foreign policy context” illustrated callousness and disregard for the 
human rights violations underway in Argentina.12 In a meeting between Kissinger and Argentine 
Foreign Minister Guzzetti, Kissinger demonstrated immense support for the military regime. 
Kissinger explained that “the quicker you [Argentine military] succeed the better” and expressed 
stated that Argentine’s military were “friends [that] out to be supported.”13 According to 
diplomatic historian Barbara Keys, Kissinger’s private foreign relations and lack of reporting 
human rights violations to Congress actually formed the groundwork for Congress’ human rights 
research and pursuit towards placing human rights in United States foreign relations. 
Congress’ human rights interest and Carter’s presidency did not immediately mitigate 
Argentina’s military human rights abuses. According to a 1977 Central Intelligence Agency 
Memorandum, the Argentine military regime made “substantial progress” in handling “problems 
of leftist subversives and economic disarray.”14 The United States Embassy in Argentina wrote 
an overview of the Argentine climate as of 1977 and the resulting condition of the military’s 
“cautious course of imposing order, cleaning up the more obvious corruption and economic 
chaos.”15 Through depicting the military regime as “imposing order” and “cleaning up,” it 
became readily apparent that even once Carter was in office, the United States Embassy viewed 
the sense of order in Argentina as a positive and organizational force rather than a source of 
tremendous human rights violations. Key players of Carter’s administration eventually learned 
                                                          
12 Barbara Keys, “Congress, Kissinger, and the Origins of Human Rights Diplomacy," Diplomatic 
History 34, no. 5 (November 1, 2010): 832-851. 
http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=b9ccbc19-d314-4a30-920c-
e2288c065bb9%40sessionmgr4009&vid=2&hid=4102 (accessed March 15, 2017), 823.  
13 United States Department of State, “Secretary's Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti,” 7 
October 1976, Memorandum of Conversation, The National Security Archive, 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB104/Doc6%20761007.pdf (accessed April 10, 2017), 3-4.  
14 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Memorandum: Argentina,” 22 February 1977, 
Memorandum, U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/270391.pdf 
(accessed April 30, 2017), 278.  
15 United States Embassy Argentina, PARM, 4.  
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that the Dirty War was not indicative of a healthy powerful government but rather an abusive 
regime. With the help of grassroots and international human rights efforts, the United States 
learned about the gross violations by the military regime and felt compelled to act. 
Partially as a result of Kissinger’s private diplomacy, Congress began taking the 
responsibility of human rights investigation and support in their hands near the mid-1970s. 
Washington’s drumming up of human rights policy primed Washington’s stage for grassroots 
and international human rights involvement. Congress, therefore, began pursuing human rights 
research and interests in the early to mid-1970s, a few years before Carter even came to office.16 
Representative Thomas M. Fraser, member of House International Relations Subcommittee on 
International Organizations and Movements, played a key role in the integration of human rights 
foreign policy into United States congressional interest and policy.17 According to Fraser, if 
Henry Kissinger had been “less haughty vis-a`-vis the Congress” Congress would not have 
developed legislation specifically to protect human rights.18 Fraser’s passion and dedication for 
human rights policy in congressional legislation proved integral during the mid-1970s during 
Ford’s administration.19 In 1973, Fraser proposed to the House an expansion of the Assistant 
Secretary’s role to advocate for human rights policy and declared the United States responsible 
to “terminate all military assistance and sales to any government committing serious violations 
                                                          
16 William Michael Schmidli, "Human rights and the Cold War: the campaign to halt the Argentine ‘dirty 
war’," Cold War History 12, no. 2 (May 2012): 345-365. 
http://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=06df2ec4-2545-4e63-a1f8-
09da2431daef%40sessionmgr102&vid=2&hid=121 (accessed March 15, 2017), 348.  
17 Ibid, 350. 
18 Ibid, 350. 
19 Ibid, 350.  
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of human rights.”20 Fraser urged Washington’s human rights advocacy several years before the 
Dirty War’s inception.  
While Ford’s administration built relationships with Latin American militaries and later 
justified economic aid to support the military regime, Fraser and other members of Congress 
advocated for legislative checks on global human rights conditions.21 Even before the mid-1970s, 
Congress was expected to uphold human rights to an extent, but the language in congressional 
document was often weak, subjective, and difficult to enforce. Human rights section 502B was 
written in 1961 to flimsily enforce human rights and “promote and encourage increased respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.”22 At the time of original publication, the 
document lacked clear definition of human rights and the enforcement of human rights, such as 
United Sates foreign aid to countries in violation of human rights abuse. In November of 1975, 
Fraser “added teeth to 502B” and replaced the ‘sense of Congress’ with legally binding 
agreement to deny US security assistance to countries violating human rights.23 Although Ford 
opposed 502B’s newfound teeth, the bill was passed.24 Congress exhibited a unified commitment 
to human rights, and passionate members of Congress set the scene for Carter’s 1977 election 
and presidential enforcement of human rights policy.  
Carter’s presidential platform was not reserved in its passion for human rights policy and 
prioritizing global protection from gross violations. Only a few months after his presidency, 
Carter’s Notre Dame Address illustrated Carter’s commitment to his administration’s 
                                                          
20 Representative Donald M. Fraser, “All Bill Information (Except Text) for H.R.10455 - A bill to 
establish within the Department of State a Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs, and for other purposes,” 20 
September 1973. 93rd Congress, https://www.congress.gov/bill/93rd-congress/house-bill/10455/all-info, 
(accessed April 7, 2017).  
21 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere. 
22 United Nations, “General Assembly Thirty-fourth Session” November 1979, Meeting Notes, 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/34/a34res49.pdf, (accessed 30 March 2017), 172.  
23 Schmidli, Human Rights and the Cold War, 350.  
24 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere. 
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transparency and intentional interaction with the American public.  Above all, the address 
underscored human rights as the first of five goals to “reaffirm America’s commitment to human 
rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy.”25 Since the United States’ economy was 
suffering through a period of a domestic economic slump, many of Carter’s critics thought that 
Carter’s human rights policy was too ideological and negligent of American domestic interests. 
In the era following détente’s underwhelming results and an American public plagued by the 
aftermath of Vietnam, Americans might have felt cautious to take a stance of global intervention. 
United States policy that revolved around global interests might have made the public hesitant to 
jump on Carter’s platform of global involvement on the grounds of humanitarian aid.  
Carter, however, viewed global human rights protection as the cornerstone of sharing 
United States’ interest of freedom and liberty with the world. According to the October 1977 
Department State Bulletin, the results of the Organization of American States General Assembly 
in Grenada revealed that several other countries expressed interest to join forces with America to 
prevent human rights violations. At the conference, Resolution 315 was passed to support the 
Inter-American Human Rights Commission intensive human rights investigations and strict no 
tolerance stance towards human rights abuses, specifically torture and detention.26 With global 
support and recent congressional formation of human rights policy, Carter’s administration 
received formal support to protect human rights in Argentina and withdraw economic aid to 
Argentina during the Dirty War. Carter’s presidency from 1977 to 1981 allowed adequate time 
                                                          
25 Jimmy Carter, “President Jimmy Carter, Address at the University of Notre Dame, 1977,” in American 
Foreign Relations Since 1898, ed. Jeremi Suri (Hoboken: Blackwell, 2013.), 171. 
26 US Department of State, “The Department of State Bulletin Vol. LXXVII, No. 2000” 24 October 1977, 
Hein Online, 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/dsbul77&collection=journals&startid=&endid=
650&id=615 (accessed 16 March 2017). 
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for a change in human rights policy and strengthened the relationship between Washington and 
grassroots human rights organizers, both in America and abroad.  
The infancy of the human rights movement during Carter’s administrations was not 
without hiccups and disagreements. Despite the shared interest between Congress and Carter’s 
administration, the relative newness of global human rights enforcement challenged United 
States officials to formulate an effective methodology to end abuse but maintain a diplomatic 
relationship with Argentina. According to a 1977 note written by Patricia Derian, Secretary of 
States of Human Rights, Washington’s many working parts lacked cohesion in the execution of 
human rights policies.27 The effectiveness of economic sanctions was one of the most contested 
topics. The 1977 PARM document stated that “sanctions to coerce a change in behavior are both 
ineffective and counterproductive,” which revealed an initial hesitancy to eradicate human rights 
abuse through economic measures.28 Although the administration valiantly advocated for human 
rights protection, the most effective form of implementation was up for debate. Despite 
reservations of sanctions’ effectiveness, nascent human rights policy during the Dirty War 
exercised economic sanctions as a means of rebuking human rights abuses.  
The debate of economic sanctions immensely influenced the development of human 
rights policy, and the issue remained pertinent considering the United States was sending money 
to Argentina used to purchase the weapons that tortured and killed Argentine people. Carter’s 
approach to impose economic sanctions as a diplomatic form of negotiations and condemnation 
offered the first glimpse of human rights integration into United States foreign policy. Economic 
sanctions sent a clear message to Argentina: countries that violate human rights will not be 
                                                          
27 United States Department of State Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 
“Human Rights Policy” (21 October 1977), Letter of Complaint, Digital National Security Archive, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1679047477?accountid=710 (accessed 15 March 2017). 
28 United States Embassy Argentina, PARM, 8.  
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supported by the United States. Economic sanctions, however, only began to introduce Carter’s 
administration’s dedication to human rights.  Leveraging economic power illustrated a classic 
form of United States diplomacy to establish allies, enemies, and anyone in-between. Carter’s 
true innovation of human rights advocacy stemmed from his thoughtful inclusion of grassroots 
advocates in United States foreign policy and response to stopping worldwide oppression.  
Since the Dirty War targeted activists and presumably left-wing individuals directly, 
human rights organization in Argentina proved life-threatening. Human rights activists displayed 
clear opposition to the military regime. In response, the military regime identified activists as 
left-wing groups who must be silenced. Because of the heightened danger plaguing activists, 
outside help and pressure from organizations (both government and non-governmental) were key 
to help stop the human rights abuses. Brave Argentines organized and spurred awareness of the 
gross human rights violations. One of the most notable advocacy organizations was – and 
continues to be – Madres de Plazo de Mayo, known as “Madres.” To this day, the Madres march 
every Thursday in front of Casa Rosada, Argentina’s most powerful government building, to 
mourn the loss of “disappeared” children and demand the government’s recognition and attempt 
to reconcile the past human rights abuses. The Madres have directly experienced the pain caused 
by the Dirty War, and their continual marches symbolize peaceful resistance and personal 
pressure to end the abductions, abuse, and murder under the military regime.29  
During the Dirty War, the Madres worked with The Center of Legal and Social Studies 
(CELS) to start a reformist movement that demanded the government’s “strengthening adherence 
to existing law as a form of humanitarian governance” rather than writing new laws to promote 
                                                          
29 Robert L. Oprisko and Olivia Grace Wolfe, “Resisting Tyranny: Human Rights Organizations, International 
Organizations, and Promotion of the Rule of Law in Argentina,” Politics, Bureaucracy, and Justice 4, no. 2 (2014): 
13-26. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2544378 (accessed April 1, 2017), 13. 
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human rights.30 The combination of the Madres personal protest with the legal advice of CELS 
proved a powerful union to bring awareness to abuse and democratize Argentina.31 In 1977, the 
Madres collected a petition with over 24,000 signatures to send to Argentine government and 
increase internal awareness of the human rights abuse.32 Additionally, the Madres and CELS 
sent letters to international human rights organizations such as the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights and Amnesty International.33 Between international traction of the Madres 
marches and established connections with international human rights advocacy, the Madres and 
CELS established international support for Argentina and laid the groundwork for international 
intervention and investigation. In the 1983 Congressional hearing focused on human rights, 
CELS presented findings of the experience of 607 Argentine families who reported a 
“disappeared” family member, documenting that none of the family’s received information from 
the Argentine government regarding absent family members.34 As a result, the United Nations 
Commission for Human Rights called on the Department of State to “re-evaluate its practice of 
relying on self-serving assertions” regarding the human rights interests of “repressive 
governments considered ‘friendly’ to the United States.”35 CELS’ findings brought awareness to 
human rights violations and integrated the findings into Congress.  
In the United States, human rights organizations began to gain more momentum in the 
mid-1970s and eventually formed partnerships with Argentina to work together against human 
                                                          
30 Oprisko and Wolfe, “Resisting Tyranny,” 16. 
31 Ibid, 14.  
32 Ibid, 15.  
33 Ibid, 17.  
34 Human rights in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay: Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Human Rights and International Organizations and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, House of Representative, 98th Congress., 1st sess., October 4 and 21, 1983. 
HathiTrust Digital Library. 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.31210011734462;view=1up;seq=15. (accessed April 25, 
2017), 33.  
35 Ibid, 40.  
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rights abuses. Activists in the 1970s invented a form of “post-populist reform style” to 
emphasize pressuring political leaders rather than focus on mass mobilization.36 The human 
rights movement transformed policy by emphasizing pressure on political leaders instead of 
simply organizing many people interested in human rights. In this way, the human rights 
movement became more strategic and required less human capital to achieve greater political 
victories. Since the United States was struggling with a slugging domestic economy, human 
rights activists in the United States had to convince the public and policy-makers of the 
importance of human rights over domestic interests. The United States prides itself on 
international support and providing a moral compass for the world, so integrating human rights 
into policy required strong networks of international alliances to prove that human rights is a 
global issue, not merely a phase in US interest.37 
Human rights efforts in the non-governmental United States sector often utilized tactics 
from the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements, such as mass mobilization and letter-
writing on behalf of Argentina’s prisoners, to attract attention to the movement.38 In response to 
international attention, The United Nations Working Group on Disappearances (established in 
1980) communicated with various non-governmental organizations to connect individual 
experiences into mass documentation of human rights abuse.39 The Working Group compiled 
1,377 disappearance cases for submission to the Argentine government.40 Resistance to the Dirty 
War depended on transnational collaboration and communication to reveal human rights 
violation and foster support. In the age of developing technology, the human rights movement in 
the United States often relied on fast communication through telephone and media’s emergence 
                                                          
36 Cmiel, "The Emergence” 1240.  
37 Cmiel, "The Emergence" 1239. 
38 Schmidli, Human Rights and the Cold War, 354.  




to learn about and become involved in international movements.41 The publicity from mass 
mobilization fueled human rights groups to lobby Congress and influence Washington’s 
international policymaking by the mid-1970s.42 Similar to human rights efforts in Argentina, 
organizers in the United States combined awareness of atrocities and publication to propagate the 
urgency of human rights policy to restore the rights of Argentines during the Dirty War.  
Between human rights organization and interests blossoming in both United States and 
Argentina, the connection between both countries presented a passionate ideological partnership 
to end the abuse of the Dirty War. Activists’ shared concern for the freedom, respect, and liberty 
of all people transcended political interests and placed the common cause of humanitarian aid at 
the forefront. With a clear commitment on behalf of both Argentines and Americans, United 
States officials began opening doors to international human rights organizations to offer a 
comprehensive perspective of Argentina’s situation. The international nature of human rights 
organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights First, and the International League 
of Human Rights gave a sense of official legitimacy and power to the grassroots activism.43 
Despite what appeared to be a sudden interest in human rights and international 
protection of rights for all, the human rights rhetoric took a direct place in law almost thirty years 
ago by the United Nations. The international human rights organization stated in the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights that “human rights should be protected by the rule of 
law” to life.44 Human rights ideas in the first half of the 20th century, however, tended to be 
pushed aside in the name of the Cold War. Furthermore, human rights in the context of the 
United Nations potentially positioned human rights more as a political policy initiative than an 
                                                          
41 Cmiel, "The Emergence" 1238.  
42 Schmidli, Human Rights and the Cold War, 358.  
43 Cmiel, "The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States," 1243.  
44 United Nations. “1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights” 10 December 1948.  
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apolitical preservation of humanity. Once human rights non-governmental and international 
organizations acted against abuse in the 1970s, human rights became “chic” and a movement that 
gained publicity.45 The mid-1970s presented optimal timing for an international human rights 
movement: Carter’s presidency with human rights as the main focus, the age of information, and 
growing grassroots movements that exposed worldwide violations.  
Human rights were flourishing at the grassroots and international level, and Washington 
was ready to engage with many different organizations as a method of informing policy. Jimmy 
Carter’s Presidential Directive on February 17, 1978 outlined Carter’s goals for United States 
human rights policy. Carter stated that the United States should “use its full range of diplomatic 
tools” that included non-governmental organizations and international organizations.46 The 
message demonstrated passionate endorsement of a comprehensive human rights policy to 
leverage all sources of knowledge and power to help end the abuse taking place in Argentina’s 
Dirty War. Congress would not be restricted to governmental influence of Washington. Instead, 
Congress would integrate lawyers, non-governmental organizations, and Argentine voices into 
policy-making. The United States Embassy in Argentina was in full agreement with Carter and 
outlined human rights protections as a “priority to those involving illegal, detention, torture, and 
execution.”47 Argentina’s annual assessment continued to express a desire in policy to consult 
with embassies of other nations and private organizations to make balanced, informed decisions.  
Washington’s and Argentina’s willingness to supplement the political approach of human 
rights with international opinion and non-governmental organizations demonstrated a 
transnational movement that united people based off protection from abuse, regardless of 
                                                          
45 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere, 56.  
46 Jimmy Carter, “Human Rights,” Presidential Directive (17 February 1981), Digital National Security    
Archive, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1679039472?accountid=7103 (accessed 5 March 2017).   
47 United States Embassy Argentina, PARM, 6.  
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political affiliation. There are several examples of Americans and Argentines working together 
to present before Congress. The New York Bar Association visited Argentina to understand the 
conditions and testified on behalf of the Argentines in United States Congress in 1979.48 An 
international organization, Comision Argentina por los Derechos Humanos (CADHU), 
established national branches to form an investigative team to gather Argentine human rights 
abuse information and presented findings to the United States House Subcommittee on Human 
Rights.49 In Argentina, the United States Embassy similarly worked with United States lawyers 
to prepare arguments at the Inter-American Human Rights Conference.50 At the IAHRC 
conference, lawyers strategized between prominent human rights organizations such as League 
for the Rights of Man and Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights to expose and extinguish 
the human rights violation of Argentina’s Dirty War that had so far taken at least 15,000 lives.51 
Extensive collaboration between borders, ideas, and organization structure yielded immense 
connectivity and fuel to push back against the Dirty War in a multi-dimensional and informed 
fashion. 
The growing support for human rights at an international and grassroots level was 
mirrored with structural and policy changes in Washington. Although the integration of human 
rights into policy in Washington was certainly a team effort, congressional representative and 
chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations and 
Movements Donald M. Fraser played a key role. As previously mentioned, Fraser began 
pioneering human rights work in Washington around 1973, but his work continued into Carter’s 
                                                          
48 Alison Brysk, "From above and below social movements, the international system, and human rights in 
Argentina," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 3 (January 1993): 259 
49 Ibid, 264.  
50 United States Embassy, Argentina, “Visit of IAHRC--Human Rights Organization's Preparations and 
Concerns” 23 January 1979, Confidential Cable, Digital National Security Archive, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1679047265?accountid=7103 (accessed 7 March 2017). 
51 Ibid.  
Legg 16 
 
administration and proved essential to codifying the interests, concerns, and teamwork of 
grassroots and international human rights organizers. Fraser’s team hosted congressional 
hearings to learn more about international human rights abuses, and about 150 cases were heard 
from 1973-1978.52 In a September 1976 congressional session, the Subcommittee on 
International Relations heard from a variety of Argentine witnesses, ranging from a priest, 
lawyer, and a member of the Argentine Commission on Human Rights.53 Father James Weeks of 
the La Sallette Mission Society shared his seminary’s experience with the Argentine military, 
vividly re-telling the military’s abrupt break-in to Weeks’ home and “search for arms and 
subversive literature.”54 Weeks continued to explain that his investigation – and the 
imprisonment of his 5 seminarians – was not an isolated, unique event but rather one example of 
the many human rights violations underway.55 As illustrated, Fraser’s congressional hearings 
included a variety of perspectives and increased collaboration between Washington and 
Argentine people. Teamwork proved an essential element utilized by the United States to stand 
in solidarity with and create policies to support with victims of the Dirty War. Furthermore, 
Fraser created a Department of State Bureau of Human Rights to induce a sense of permanence 
to the human rights policies emerging in the 1970s.56  
Soon after the committee’s formation, Carter issued a complete arms embargo with 
Argentina to demonstrate condemnation of human rights violations. In a 1978 telegram from the 
Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina, The Secretary decided that “we cannot go 
                                                          
52 Schmidli, Human Rights and the Cold War, 348.  
53 Human rights in Argentina: Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the 
Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 2nd sess., September 28 
and 29, 1976,  HathiTrust Digital Library. 
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forward, as hoped, with military training packages and defense,” partially influenced by Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights’ evaluation of Argentina’s human rights violations.57 
The Argentine Navy soon sent an evaluation of the “termination of US bilateral military 
assistance” to the US Department of State to express that the Argentine military would connect 
with other countries, such as the eager Soviet Union, to achieve military support.58 Argentine 
Navy viewed the embargo’s impact on human rights “probably limited” due to Argentina’s 
sovereignty.59 Regardless, the United States arms embargo sent a clear signal to Argentina: the 
US refused to support countries undertaking human rights abuse. In a 1977 presidential 
memorandum, President Carter voiced his concern about human rights pressure and foreign 
relations. In Carter’s words, “pressures for human rights and non-proliferation have raised new 
fears about U.S. intervention and paternalism.”60 Despite the “new fears,” Carter’s policies 
continued to prioritize human rights. Ultimately, Carter’s administration deemed Argentina’s 
devastating human rights violations as paramount compared to the risks of intervention.  
In addition to an arms embargo, Carter’s administration practiced an inverse relationship 
between human rights abuse and economic aid. To measure the relationship between human 
rights and economic investment, scholars of human rights and economic aid established the 
Freedom House human rights score to operationalize human rights abuse on a scale from one to 
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seven, with seven exhibiting severe violations of “civil and political rights.”61 For every one-
point rise in a country’s human rights score in 1978, Carter’s administration cut aid by 19 million 
dollars.62 Since Argentina’s human rights score was 4.46 in 1978, the Argentines lost about 
eighty-five million dollars in aid.63 After congressional changes and the United States arms 
embargo with Argentina, Washington officials continued dialogue with Argentine officials to 
fully communicate the intent of economic sanctions, arms embargo, and investigations of human 
rights violations. In 1979, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Patricia Derian spoke 
with an Argentine businessman Mr. Rozenblaum to discuss both economic impacts of recent 
congressional policy and the thought process of the United States behind the ban of arms sales.64 
Ms. Derian emphasized the United States desire to avoid supporting Argentina’s regime, though 
not to become a punitive enemy, with a country engaging in human rights abuse. Implementation 
of Carter’s human rights policies, therefore, relied on personal communication between United 
States officials in Washington and Argentine citizens in power. United States officials’ follow 
through with Argentine’s citizens and military leaders demonstrated a commitment to better 
understand the reaction and impact of United States policy to reduce human rights abuse.  
In December of 1983, democracy was restored to Argentina, and the military government 
was replaced by President Raul Alfonsin.65 The tragic “disappearance” of approximately 30,000 
Argentines, however, will continue to live in the historical memory of Argentina and the entire 
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world. To this day, Argentine military officials are on trial for human rights abuses of torture and 
death during the Dirty War. The Argentine government established Day of Remembrance for 
Truth and Justice annually on March 24 to mourn the lives lost in the Dirty War and remind 
Argentines that trials continue to bring awareness and justice to the regime’s offenders. Many 
mothers and fathers have yet to receive confirmation of their child’s “disappearance” and must 
live everyday urging the government to divulge the full list victim list and help each affected 
person mourn and receive closure. The tragedy’s devastating impact on Argentines cannot be 
underscored enough.  
United States’ involvement in the Dirty War set crucial precedents for collaboration 
between grassroots, international, and government entities all linking arms to resist abuse and 
advocate for all. Washington Post’s 1984 piece “Argentines Thank Carter for Human Rights 
efforts” offers a glimpse into the United States policy’s impact to support the rights of people 
detained during the Dirty War. Although the human rights policies might have “eluded him 
[Carter] at home,” Carter was praised and revered for organizing United States aid (the most 
helpful country to Argentina, according to some).66 Despite the human rights efforts, author 
Martin Anderson expressed weariness about human rights future in the hands of Ronald Reagan, 
who aimed to support all “strong governments that are our friends.”67 Although Reagan certainly 
did not prioritize human rights with the same passion as Carter, Reagan’s financial policies 
mirrored that of Carter and strongly correlated United States economic aid with a country’s 
respect for human rights.68  
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Even though Reagan did not share the same emphasis of human rights policy, Carter’s 
administration incorporated human rights policy into congress and built strong relationships with 
international and grassroots organizations. The relationships formed cannot be ignored and set an 
expectations of human rights policy for subsequent administrations. Carter’s administration is 
often criticized for lack of cohesion in human rights policy and its application, but the human 
rights movement started to “raise the world's consciousness of human rights, and thus provided a 
measure of hope for the victims.”69 The human rights movement that emerged during the Dirty 
War established transnational ties predicated on the shared will to preserve the rights and dignity 
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